Iran’s Permanent Ambassador to Vienna-based International Organizations Kazem Gharibabadi made the remarks in an online session on Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015).
The full text of Gharibabadi's speech is as follows:
Madam Chairperson, Director-General, Excellencies, Ladies, and Gentlemen,
The Director General’s new report on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) illustrates the Agency's ability to verify Iran's commitments under the Deal and its utmost level of cooperation with the Agency. The Reports on this agenda item during the past 5 years have an identical paragraph which, regardless of the differences among the JCPOA participants on the level of implementation of the reciprocal commitments, is a good testament of the level of cooperation between Iran and the Agency. The DG’s reports confirm that {I quote:} “Since 16 January 2016 (JCPOA Implementation Day), the Agency has verified and monitored Iran’s implementation of its nuclear-related commitments in accordance with the modalities set out in the JCPOA…” {end of quote}. It means that the Agency was even able to verify and monitor the steps taken by Iran in accordance with paragraphs 26 and 36 of the Deal. The reports even confirm that the Agency has not observed any change in the level of cooperation by Iran and despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Agency has continued to maintain its smooth verification and monitoring activities in Iran.
However, the Director General’s reports should be seen in their proper contexts; The JCPOA is a concrete highly elaborated Deal composed of balanced commitments made by its participants and like any other deals, it is supposed to benefit its participants. In fact, with the persistent United States irresponsible conduct, through adopting malign policies and imposing unlawful unilateral sanctions, the Deal has lost its balance of commitments, leading to the loss of the perceived benefits for Iran.
Therefore, while Iran is entitled to take remedial measures, the United States shall bear full responsibility for the consequences of its wrongful acts in clear contradiction with the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions of the Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015).
Madam Chair,
The JCPOA created a clear conducive context within which multilateralism was gaining more weight. In the past five years, the Board of Governors has witnessed many statements elaborating on the values and advantages of the JCPOA for the non-proliferation regime, but one shouldn’t ignore the fact that the Deal includes other essential categories of commitments, namely lifting of the sanctions and its effects.
As it is envisaged in the nuclear Deal{I quote} “the JCPOA addresses the E3/EU+3’s concerns, including through comprehensive measures providing for transparency and verification. The JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear program, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance, and energy”{end of quote}.
Although the US Administration didn’t abide by its obligations completely, however, the situation was aggravated when the US Administration announced its unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA on 8 May 2018. That very announcement and the subsequent coercive measures taken by the US Administration and lack of full and effective implementation of the commitments by EU/E3 members enshrined in the JCPOA to remedy the situation have brought about serious challenges to the Deal.
While the Deal was effectively and fully implemented by Iran and managed to create exemplary cooperation between Iran and the Agency, it was not implemented on the sanctions lifting side, especially during the past two and a half years. Unfortunately, the EU/E3 didn’t fulfil their sanctions-related commitments, and commitments related to the civil nuclear cooperation with Iran in this period, either. Hence, calling on Iran to fully implement its commitments while knowing the fact that Iran’s legitimate benefits from the Deal have not been realized, is neither reasonable nor a practical approach.
Madam Chair,
There is no way to justify the illegal US withdrawal and the imposition of sanctions as well as its subsequent acts and the other party’s inaction to remedy the situation; therefore, overstating the levels of which Iran has gone beyond the JCPOA limits, aggrandizing Iran's R & D activities, and expressing concerns in this regard, can only be considered as endeavours to shoulder off the responsibilities of non-implementation of their commitments during past two and half years.
If some are concerned with the current level of activities, this has nothing to do with Iran and its exclusively peaceful nuclear program, so they are strongly recommended to implement their commitments under the Deal and the UN Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) to bring this derailed train to its proper track. On the other hand, I would like to draw the attention of these countries to the inhuman and destructive impacts of the US brutal sanctions on the Iranian people.
It should be regrettably noted that sanctions even during the COVID-19 pandemic have not been eased. It should also be acknowledged that the maximum pressure policy is proven to be doomed to fail. Considering the imposition of unlawful sanctions by the US as well as adopting an inactive position by the others, one couldn't expect Iran to stand idle as if nothing was happened, and do nothing in relation to its commitments under the JCPOA.
It is also important to be noted that cooperation is obviously not Iran’s only option. Iran still has various options to establish a necessary balance to the Deal. I would also like to reiterate the already pronounced position of the Islamic Republic of Iran that whenever the lost balance between the rights and commitments of the JCPOA participants as stipulated by the Deal is restored through lifting sanctions and implementing commitments in this field, Iran is ready to reverse its remedial actions.
The JCPOA can only be saved through joint efforts and actions to ensure that the rights and obligations therein are fully materialized.
Madam Chair,
We welcome the fact that as a result of constructive engagement between Iran and the Agency, providing complimentary access is no longer an issue between Iran and the Agency. In the same spirit, we believe that on the issue of the results of the Agency's visit to a location in Iran in early 2019, the report itself testifies the extent of cooperation between Iran and the Agency.
The Islamic Republic of Iran has been engaging with the Agency constantly in the past months. During January 2020, pursuant to the information provided by Iran related to the possible origin of the detected natural uranium particles dated 5 and 31 December 2019, the Agency took environmental samples at two declared nuclear facilities in Iran.
Afterwards, in September 2020, the Agency, after eight months of taking samples, informed Iran of its preliminary assessment on the responses provided by Iran and shared with us a totally new finding for clarification. Accordingly, on 21 October 2020, Iran replied to the Agency’s questions. Iran also informed the Agency that in relation to the isotopically altered particles “the evidence of such contamination is under investigation”. Additionally, on 5 November 2020, Iran provided the Agency with more clarification related to the matter.
As it seems to be normal to have the analysis of the samples by the Laboratories with delays due to the situation, even for almost eight months, which we also quite understand, it also should not be seen abnormal for Iran to be in need of reasonable time to investigate on the issues raised by the Agency in September this year, only two and a half months ago.
It should be stressed that in accordance with the provisions of the JCPOA, Iran is provisionally and voluntarily implementing the Additional Protocol; therefore, providing the Agency with the requested access was done in good-will, and this should be seen as a foundation to resolve the issue, meaning a beginning for an end. Thus, expressing concerns or setting artificial deadlines without due consideration of the context within which we are in, is counter-productive and will damage the existing good-will.
It is noteworthy that despite the different understanding of technical matters between the two sides, interactions are still ongoing with a view to finalizing the resolution of the matter, hence any hasty comments and conclusions should be avoided.
Madam Chair,
The US delegation was quoted that Iran should be exposed to a robust and the same high standards for verification as others. What kind of standards they are referring to?! American ones, as a result of which the international norms and regulations were ruined!
The Agency including the late DG Amano was of the opinion that the JCPOA is an exemplary model for the verification regime and he hoped to implement it in other Members of the Agency.
The Secretariat has also confirmed on many occasions, including in various interviews, technical briefings, etc. that a robust verification system is in place in Iran. However, if it is believed that any Member has higher standards for the verification measures, and if it is agreed by the BoG and the Secretariat, Iran is ready to consider it as an example! Absolutely, as a result of which, the level of cooperation and interaction between Iran and the IAEA would be dramatically reduced which we welcome.
The US cannot be seen as honest in its claims about having non-proliferation concerns, when it has thousands of nuclear warheads, proliferated such weapons and the related know-how, used it against a non-nuclear-weapon State, and threatens the others with the possible use of them. Indeed, such a country is not even entitled to talk about nonproliferation concerns.
On the same line, the Israeli regime is the only one in the Middle East which is not a member of any of the Weapons of Mass-Destruction instruments and developed various types of such weapons.
How much the US is concerned about this threatening situation? If non-members are rewarded and being a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is a disadvantage, it would send a diametrically different signal to its Members. Likewise, how much the US is concerned about the standards of verification carried out by the KSA and the UAE, who officially have still SQPs? If they are honest in their claims about the implementation of high verification standards by the Members of the Agency, how do they think about the implementation of such verification standards in other parts of the Middle East? How many times do they have expressed concerns in this regard?
However, the Islamic Republic of Iran does not deem any value on unfounded and demagogic noises and claims by the US and Israeli regime which their main purpose is to put pressure on and divert the Agency and the Member States to achieve their political interests.
I thank you Madam Chairperson
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