Jun 15, 2015, 12:54 PM

By: Hanif Ghaffari

US accomplice with Israel in N-talks spying raw

US accomplice with Israel in N-talks spying raw

TEHRAN, Jun. 15 (MNA) – The recent spying from a number of hotels where Iran and the 5+1 held nuclear negotiations has stolen the limelight, thrusting Israel again as a party to the spy case.

Russian cyber security giant Kaspersky Lab has recently found that a virus, mainly developed by the Zionist regime, had been traced in spy case in five hotels where Iran and the 5+1 lead nuclear negotiations; these hotels are located in Vienna, Montero, Geneva, and Lausanne, cities where nuclear negotiations had been regularly held. Those used for talks include the Beau-Rivage Palace in Lausanne, Switzerland, the Intercontinental in Geneva, the Palais Coburg in Vienna, the Hotel President Wilson in Geneva, the Hotel Bayerischer Hof in Munich and Royal Plaza Montreux in Montreux, Switzerland.

Kaspersky Lab announced that three hotels had been hit by a virus, dubbed Duqu and originally developed by Israeli spies to collect information about nuclear negotiations; the virus hit the systems two or three weeks before talks. Large bulk of commentary has been addressing the case in the international and local media; however, what matters here and relating to the present discussion is the liaison between the US and Israeli intelligence systems in carrying out this spying operation. A review of the US officials’ behavior and psychology about the spy case and Israel’s role would be quite revealing.

 

The principle of ‘observe victim’s reaction’

During the eavesdropping of Iran and the 5+1 nuclear negotiations by the Zionist regime, not only the host countries, but also all six states engaged in nuclear negotiations with Iran shall be considered as victims of the espionage; yet their behavior does not properly seem as victims of a security action hitting them. The natural reaction of a victim of security attack includes the following:

- Harshly condemning the spying party;

- Disclosing everything about different aspects of the spying party to the media and official outlets;

- Bringing the case to court and other official legal authorities;

- If possible, embarking on a retaliation attempt.

But the question is whether the US ever displayed one of such reactions as a possible victim of spying. In any case, the US is seen as one of the victims of spy case. A review of official remarks by the US officials about spying by Israel from nuclear negotiations venues promising of interesting findings and clue to the nature of reactions; “We take steps, certainly, to ensure that confidential, classified negotiating details stay behind closed doors in these negotiations,” State Department Spokesman Jeff Rathke said Thursday. “We are always mindful of the need… to take steps to keep our discussions confidential,” he added.

The US reaction about spying case would clearly show the following inferences possible to make:

- They would not deny the case in its entirety;

- They would not address the details;

- They would not bring the case to a court or judicial body;

- They would only superficially and mildly condemn the act of espionage.

The next important question is whether the Zionist officials would be able to carry out spying operations in nuclear negotiation venues without a US green light. The key to this question lies in a name famous in US-Israel intelligence services: Jonathan Pollard.

Pollard was a Jewish American who received a life sentence for spying for Israel. He is now an inmate in North Carolina. He was an analyst in US Naval Intelligence Command and had been shopping sensitive information to former Soviet Union, Pakistan, Syria, and Libya through a liaison with Aviem Sella, a combat veteran of the Israeli Air Force and received money and other services. Israel would pay Pollard $2,500 in cash, a few pieces of diamonds, hotel, and restaurant expenses. Pollard was transferring information in a bag every Friday to Israel’s embassy. In one of such meetings, he passed to Israel sensitive information in few bags in January 23, 1985. Israel naturalized Pollard as a citizen; however, it had denied until 1998 buying sensitive information from Pollard. Still now Israel is working in lobbying attempts to release Pollard from prison. US intelligence officials see Pollard case a tough lesson to Zionists, lest they would not entertain spying on the US. Israeli officials predict that Pollard will be released in November 2015. They had been negotiating with the US officials about Pollard. The case precipitated a few cases of Israeli apologies to the US and a commitment not to let the occasion happen.

 

Washington-Tel Aviv modus operandi in nuclear negotiation venue

Intelligence overlap

Overlapping in targets

The US and its intelligence bodies had been aware of the spying case; they themselves had been an accomplice in the spy operation and setting targets. Tamir Pardo, the incumbent Director of the Mossad, is the major player in intelligence arrangement and policy targeting closely working with US intelligence organizations. Benjamin Netanyahu nominated him for the position in 2010 after he agreed to supervise the policies on Iran’s nuclear dossier. Within a year and half and with nuclear negotiations in their high frequency, Pardo’s secret operations have been also intense.

 

Overlapping in operations

In operations, it should be noted that the US has operated in its own spying arrangements from nuclear negotiation venues. In November 2013 (just ahead of Geneva Joint Plan of Action) in Hotel Intercontinental in Geneva, the US spy case leaked to the media. Michael Mann, Spokesman to Catherine Ashton, EU Foreign Policy Chief responded the press when posed the question whether the nuclear negotiations venue was secure enough (given the US spying on the negotiations): “to find the answer, ask US officials; I am not their spokesman, but EU spokesman and not in a position to answer this and I do not like to answer.”

His answer is not very unlike reaction the US Department of State spokesperson made about Israel’s spying on nuclear negotiations venues.

In any case, in tactical and operational issues, there is an overlapping between US and Israel intelligence organizations. There is a division of work between two parties benefiting from spying. The first party would work in policy targeting and the second party would operationalize the policy. The red, yellow and green lines are totally explained and mutually agreed. The Zionist regime is responsible for operations to avoid unnecessary expenses. However, it has on its side US tactical support in place in policy targeting.

The nature of US reaction, Washington’s records in spying on nuclear negotiations, the EU Troika meaningful silence, and ultimately, US soft handling the issue through simply ignoring the event raises the possibility that they are an accomplice in the spy case. Obviously, there will be future reports and leaks about the spy case; this would be very disturbing prospect for the US, Israel and the EU Troika.

 

Brennan meets Tamir to find a way out of crisis

Brennan met his counterpart Mossad Chief Tamir Pardo and other intelligence officials, as well as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Haaretz reported, citing ‘senior Israeli officials.’ The meeting reportedly aimed to end the spy case through cooperation with Zionists. However, many mainstream media in the US base coverage of the issue on joint Washington and Tel Aviv circumlocution of the spying case, they will report commentary on Brennan’s visit to Israel and meeting with Pardo and Netanyahu as a legitimate visit to coordinate Washington’s policies with Tel Aviv; the reality still exists on the ground: The visit will seek to prevent any possible further leaks to the media of the spy case and Washington’s complicity to that. Controlling the crisis in the region is a common mission for Pardo and Brennan, though they would invest little hope on its success.

 

Hanif Ghaffari is political analyst and a PhD candidate on political economy.

 

News ID 107925

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