Javier Milei’s unexpected triumph in Argentina’s parliamentary elections has sparked intense debate both inside and outside the country. Conventional political forecasts suggested that soaring inflation, deepening unemployment, and the harsh impact of austerity policies would erode public support for the far-right economist. Yet the opposite occurred. According to Prof. Dr. Fernando Esteche, understanding this outcome requires looking beyond traditional electoral metrics and acknowledging a combination of structural political failures, declining voter participation, internal disarray within the Peronist opposition, and the deployment of sophisticated psychological and media operations. In his interview with Mehr News Agency, he unpacks the social, political, and geopolitical forces that paved the way for Milei’s ascent and the broader regional implications now unfolding across South America.
Considering recent developments and the media-based understanding we have of Argentina’s political trends in recent years, the victory of Javier Milei’s party in the country’s parliamentary elections was unexpected and even surprising. Given Milei’s austerity-driven, right-wing economic policies and Argentina’s unemployment and inflation statistics, it was assumed that the Argentine public would turn away from him. How should we understand Javier Milei’s victory in the parliamentary elections, and what social, political, or even psychological factors contributed to his win?
To understand these results, it is essential first to acknowledge the extremely high level of absenteeism, which substantially alters the numbers and makes the real percentages, based on the general registry, much lower than they appear. We are witnessing the lowest level of voter participation since the return of democracy in 1983—less than 68%, meaning ten points lower than in 2023. This implies that about twelve million eligible voters chose not to go to the polls.
A crucial issue must be pointed out: a significant portion of Peronist voters from the previous election did not show up this time, mistakenly assuming that victory was already guaranteed after the results from last September in Buenos Aires Province, where Peronism had won by 14 points. This attitude of complacency and underestimation of the adversary proved decisive.
Another key factor is that the opposition offered no real alternative to the threats of chaos issued by Trump and Milei regarding what would happen if they lost. There was no alternative economic policy proposal, no “Plan B” in response to the conditional bailout from the U.S. Treasury. Essentially, there was no coherent opposition campaign—poor candidates, no renewal of leadership, and a lack of strategic direction.
We must also consider the deep internal fractures within the Peronist opposition. Its leadership is diluted, entangled in internal disputes among various factions that failed to build a unified front against the advance of the far right.
There is now a profound rupture between the formal political system and the popular common sense of ordinary people.
Finally, what I consider a major cognitive warfare operation must be acknowledged—particularly one aimed at younger sectors, who were the main base of Milei’s vote. This communicational and psychological dimension, deployed through social networks and digital media, was decisive in shaping the electoral outcome. It involves techniques characteristic of contemporary hybrid warfare, where the battle over narratives and perceptions is as important as concrete governance itself.
One of Argentina’s most significant challenges is its economic crisis. For months, the Trump administration has attempted to inject a wave of liquidity into Argentina’s market by launching a currency swap mechanism. Trump even stated explicitly during his election campaign that continued financial support for Argentina would depend on the victory of Milei and his party. How do you assess Trump’s role in Argentina’s electoral campaign?
The agreements with Trump have been entirely conditional and represent direct interference in Argentina’s internal affairs. We can state without a doubt that Trump has applied in Argentina the so-called “Dollar Diplomacy” from President Taft’s era, just as he does in the Caribbean and the equatorial Pacific through Theodore Roosevelt’s “Big Stick” policy. This is a pure revival of Monroeism — an explicit form of neocolonization.
The assistance provided by the U.S. Treasury, which faces strong resistance even within U.S. domestic politics, is implemented through currency swap arrangements. It is important to emphasize that, so far, only two billion dollars out of the twenty billion committed have actually been activated. And this is not humanitarian aid or altruistic cooperation: these swaps serve to guarantee profit margins for the financial speculations of major U.S. economic groups.
We are talking about investment funds such as those led by Citrone and Stanley Druckenmiller, and about the operations of JP Morgan, which guides its investor clients and secures their positions through direct intervention in Argentina’s sovereign bond and currency markets. JP Morgan is not buying Argentine bonds out of philanthropy—it is buying into Argentina itself, positioning strategically within the national economy.
The U.S. Federal Reserve’s intervention in Argentina’s foreign exchange market is discretionary—it manipulates exchange rates and creates favorable conditions for financial speculation. This is the kind of guarantee that concentrated capital requires to operate without risk in volatile markets.
Trump not only explicitly conditioned the continuation of U.S. financial assistance on Milei’s electoral victory — a direct interference that violates basic principles of international law — but also orchestrated an entire political and media operation to secure that outcome. This included meetings at the White House, public statements of support, and even an explicit threat: “If he loses the election, we will not be generous with Argentina.”
We are witnessing a shameless process of neocolonization, where national sovereignty is traded for short-term liquidity, and where a foreign government openly defines the electoral outcome it deems most convenient for its own geopolitical and economic interests.
According to some experts, Trump sought to counter China’s influence in South America by supporting a political figure in Argentina who aligns with the US government. How do you interpret Trump’s motives for supporting Milei?
It is absolutely clear that the United States’ strategic objective is centered on containing China’s growing presence and influence in our region. Since September 2025, China has become Argentina’s second-largest trading partner, having overtaken none other than Brazil. This fact carries extraordinary geopolitical significance and marks a trend that deeply worries Washington.
Commercial cooperation between Argentina and China has reached very significant levels, which makes it difficult—though not impossible—to fully reverse this relationship in the short term. However, the U.S. objective is indeed to reserve for American companies certain strategic and highly critical niches: telecommunications, uranium, lithium, rare earths, and port and transportation infrastructure.
These are sectors that the United States considers vital to its national security and to maintaining its technological hegemony in the face of China’s growing global reach. The dispute is not merely commercial—it is fundamentally geopolitical and technological. Washington seeks to neutralize Chinese infrastructure investments, particularly those linked to the Belt and Road Initiative that China has been advancing worldwide.
This U.S. redeployment is not exclusive to Latin America; it is part of a global strategy to contain China and reaffirm U.S. hegemony in a context of structural decline of imperial power and the emergence of multipolarity. Argentina—with its strategic natural resources, especially lithium for the energy transition, uranium for the nuclear industry, and rare earths for advanced technology—has become a contested territory in this new Cold War.
The Milei government functions as the spearhead of this strategy. Its explicit alignment with Trump, participation in far-right global forums such as CPAC, and anti-China rhetoric against the so-called “communist regime” are all part of a political construction that serves Washington’s geo-economic and geo-strategic interests. It is a form of cipayismo as state policy—voluntary subordination that mortgages national sovereignty in the service of foreign powers.
These days, the underlying drivers of the elections in Argentina and Brazil are frequently compared in media circles. Could you please explain how the different psychological and economic roots in Argentina and Brazil influenced the voting patterns in the recent elections in these two countries, and what implications these differences may have for the political and economic future of each country?
I firmly believe that Argentina and Brazil cannot be compared in a simplistic way, given the profound asymmetry of their productive structures and the differentiated roles that each country occupies on the regional and global geopolitical chessboard. Brazil is a consolidated regional power, a founding member of the BRICS, with a diversified economy—the tenth largest in the world—possessing autonomous international projection and a leading role in building multipolarity.
Argentina, by contrast, has been going through a process of growing marginalization in the international arena. The deterioration of its international standing, the dismantling of productive capacities, increasing deindustrialization, and now its explicit subordination to the Washington–Miami axis place it in a radically different position.
That said, it is undeniable that there is a connection between the electoral processes of both countries. The violent events in Rio de Janeiro—particularly the massive police operation on October 28 involving 2,500 officers and over 130 deaths—are not an isolated outbreak of state violence but rather part of a broader hybrid warfare strategy. This involves the militarization of public security, the penetration of U.S. agencies in Brazilian territory (DEA, FBI, Southern Command), and the deliberate construction of a “narco-enemy” functional to geopolitical interests that go far beyond Rio’s borders.
This violence, along with the electoral results in Argentina, forms part of a wider operation aimed at influencing Brazil’s 2026 presidential elections. We should not forget that Lula required a very complex alliance to compete in the 2022 presidential race—allying with none other than the Paulista conservative Geraldo Alckmin, a traditional adversary of the Workers’ Party (PT). The fragility of that governmental coalition is precisely the weak flank that the Bolsonaro far-right seeks to exploit, with support from sectors of the U.S. establishment.
Trump’s strategy toward Brazil includes tariff threats, sanctions against judges such as Alexandre de Moraes, pressure on the Brazilian Armed Forces, and explicit support for Bolsonarism in its attempt to return to power. This is hybrid warfare in action: a combination of economic instruments (50% tariffs), legal pressure (threats of sanctions), military coercion (pressure on military bases), and media operations (disinformation campaigns).
The difference is that Brazil—due to its economic weight, its role within the BRICS, its strategic alliance with China, and its institutional resilience—still retains margins of maneuver that Argentina has almost completely lost. But the ultimate goal remains the same: to subordinate both countries to the imperial logic, dismantle autonomous regional integration processes, and ensure U.S. control over strategic resources and markets.
What types of positive and negative regional, and even global, implications might Javier Milei’s victory in the parliamentary elections carry?
I firmly believe that, regionally, this is a clear score for Trump, who shows the stick in the Caribbean with Venezuela and simultaneously displays the reward for Milei’s servility. This is deeply instructive for the entire region, sending an unmistakable message: those who submit receive aid; those who resist receive punishment.
This must be seen in the context of simultaneous operations that the United States is deploying across various theaters of Our America:
The anti-popular hybrid war that has been taking place for years in Bolivia, combining lawfare, economic destabilization, media manipulation, and political violence, which ultimately resulted in the right-wing’s electoral victory, reversing the transformative process initiated by Evo Morales.
The chaotic destabilization of formal systems in Peru and Ecuador, where democratically elected governments are constantly threatened with removal, where lawfare systematically targets popular leaderships, and where institutional instability serves transnational corporate interests.
The right-wing offensive in Colombia, where Gustavo Petro’s government faces constant threats, where Trump publicly accuses him of being an “illegal drug leader,” where sanctions are applied and military aid is threatened to be cut off—all part of a broader strategy to destabilize any progressive project.
The ongoing siege against Venezuela—economic blockade, military threats, coup attempts, intelligence operations, and systematic media warfare—all aimed at overthrowing a government that refuses to submit to Washington.
The Caribbean deployment, where the United States reasserts its control over an area it considers its “backyard,” using drug trafficking and migration as excuses to justify military interventions and political pressure.
And finally, the convenient coexistence with Brazil, where Trump applies pressure but recognizes he cannot treat Brazil as he does Argentina, given its economic magnitude and geopolitical weight. The strategy there is medium-term attrition, supporting Bolsonarism for the 2026 elections.
In this context, Uruguay and Chile must obviously look to Argentina with extreme attention. Both countries are under the radar of this regional strategy. José Antonio Kast and others in Chile represent exactly the same model as Milei: neoliberal far-right, absolute alignment with Washington, anti-state rhetoric, climate change denial, and links to global far-right forums. Uruguay, with its recently elected government of dubiously progressive pretensions, is now warned of the need to align with the hegemon.
On a global scale, Milei’s victory strengthens the international far-right—the Trump-Milei-Bolsonaro-Kast-Abascal axis that has been forming in forums like CPAC. It is the construction of a transnational ideological bloc that combines extreme neoliberalism, political authoritarianism, scientific and climate denialism, and subordination to the interests of concentrated financial capital and Zionism.
The “positive” consequences—from the perspective of imperial power—are evident: dismantling of autonomous regional integration processes (UNASUR, CELAC), weakening of spaces like MERCOSUR, subordination of strategic resources, indiscriminate market liberalization, and reversal of social and labor achievements.
The negative consequences—from the perspective of the peoples—are catastrophic: deepened dependency, economic reprimarization, state dismantling, extreme social polarization, criminalization of protest, regression in human rights, and loss of sovereignty in strategic areas.
What is at stake is not merely one government or another, but opposing civilizational models: either neocolonial subordination or the construction of sovereignty; either resource plunder or endogenous development; either dependency or autonomous regional integration; either decaying unipolarity or emerging multipolarity. Under Milei, Argentina chose the path of subordination. But history does not end here, and the peoples will have the final word.
MNA/
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