In the literature of international relations, particularly in confrontation with major powers, there has always been an unwritten yet recurring principle: the behavior of powers is dictated less by objective military or economic capacities and more by "their perception of the opposing side's political will." Simply put, what determines the course of developments is not merely the amount of power, but the degree of "credibility in the potential use of that power." It is within this framework that some Western analysts, including Laura Blumenfeld, a former advisor to the U.S. Department of State, referencing a quote attributed to Ayatollah Khomeini, point to a simple yet profound behavioral logic: in the face of power, fear can initiate pressure, and steadfastness can be the point of its cessation.
This sentence, irrespective of political or ideological valuations, is examinable at the level of power behavior analysis. In international relations, world powers generally act based on their assessment of "cost and benefit." If the cost of applying pressure is evaluated as low, pressure increases; if the cost rises or encounters sustained resistance, behavior is adjusted. Therefore, the primary issue is not merely hard power, but the "perceived deterrence rate."
Within this framework, fear is a determining variable. Fear, in the sense of successive retreats, sends a clear message to the opposing side: that behavioral boundaries are movable. In such circumstances, the opposing side, not necessarily out of hostility but based on its own rational logic, expands the scope of pressure. This is because in its calculations, the probability of success is high and the cost of advancement is low. This is the point at which the process of pressure transforms from a limited action into a gradual path of influence—an influence not necessarily accompanied by direct conflict, but shaped through the gradual alteration of behaviors, the escalation of demands, and the expansion of the sphere of effect.
Conversely, when an actor adopts a different behavioral pattern in the face of external pressure, the equation changes. This pattern does not signify emotional confrontation or rash reactions, but rather "cohesive, sustained, and predictable resistance." In such circumstances, the opposing side encounters a new reality: the cost of pressure is rising, and the usual avenues of influence no longer operate with the same ease as before.
The key point here is the distinction between "steadfastness" and the "cessation of diplomacy." Steadfastness does not mean closing the doors to dialogue; it means defining clear and reliable red lines. In fact, effective steadfastness takes shape when the opposing side concludes that a change in the other party's behavior is possible not through gradual pressure, but solely through genuine and balanced agreements. It is at this juncture that diplomacy exits an imposed state and becomes a reciprocal tool, rather than a one-sided mechanism for extracting concessions.
At the analytical level, it can be said that major powers enter a phase of "tension management" when they encounter a sustained obstacle—an obstacle that neither crumbles under short-term pressure nor alters course in response to temporary threats. In such conditions, the opposing side is compelled to redefine its calculations. This redefinition typically entails a reduction of maximalist expectations and a movement toward points of minimal yet stable agreement.
From this perspective, the relationship between pressure and steadfastness is not linear and simple, but rather behavioral and dynamic. Pressure, if met with fragile resistance, intensifies; but if it encounters sustained and unpredictable resistance, it moves toward moderation. It is this subtle difference that charts divergent paths in foreign policy.
In many strategic analyses, it is emphasized that "behavioral consistency" is one of the most critical elements of deterrence. Behavioral consistency means that the opposing side can, over time, predict a specific pattern of reactions. When this predictability exists, cost-benefit calculations shift, and the decision to apply pressure becomes more difficult. Conversely, when sudden retreats or incoherent reactions occur, the opposing side encounters a broader space for trial and error.
Within this framework, it can be argued that what some refer to as the "formula of confrontation" is, in reality, a combination of three elements: first, the clear definition of red lines; second, the maintenance of behavioral coherence over time; and third, the prevention of external pressure transforming into a cost-free instrument for internal change. Whenever these three elements weaken, the opposing side's room for maneuver expands.
Nevertheless, it must be noted that steadfastness in foreign policy does not equate to a denial of the realities of power. No actor in the international system can operate outside structural constraints. Therefore, effective steadfastness is always defined within a realistic framework—a framework in which there is no place for passivity, nor for adventurism. Rather, what matters is the precise calibration of the cost-benefit ratio at each stage of interaction.
Ultimately, it can be stated that the logic governing this approach rests on a simple yet decisive principle: in international politics, the opposing side makes decisions based not on slogans, but on a "set of repeated behaviors." If these behaviors signal weakness and retreat, pressure increases; if they signal cohesion and steadfastness, pressure moves toward management and moderation.
From this angle, the central debate is not about choosing between negotiation or confrontation, but about the quality and weight of behavior in both domains. Steadfastness, if intelligent and sustained, can even shift the course of negotiation from an imposed state to a more balanced process. In contrast, its absence will turn even the best diplomatic opportunities into instruments of pressure.
In summary, it can be said that what is posited in such analyses as the "formula of confrontation" is, in effect, a behavioral pattern: a pattern wherein fear can initiate the expansion of pressure, and steadfastness can serve as the point of its cessation or redefinition.
Within this same framework, it can be argued that the adoption of an approach grounded in steadfastness and the preservation of red lines in the face of external pressure by Iran is gradually effecting a change in the opposing side's calculations. When the message of cohesive and sustained resistance is transmitted, the opposing side will be compelled to reassess its tools and the level of its demands. This process, rather than escalating tension, can lead toward tension management and a reduction in unilateral pressures. From this perspective, certain recent indicators can be viewed as the outcome of this very shift in the perceived balance—a shift formed on the basis of an increased cost of pressure and the diminished efficacy of imposed policies.
MNA
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