In a thought-provoking analysis, Middle East Eye raises this issue: if, after the Iraq War, its principal architects in Washington and London had faced international legal mechanisms and been tried for the catastrophic consequences of their decisions, perhaps many subsequent crises—including the escalation of tensions and even the risk of more direct conflict with Iran—would have taken a different course. When placed alongside independent data and legal assessments, this claim not only does not seem exaggerated, but becomes an analytical rule for understanding international politics: Impunity breeds the repetition of violence.
From the perspective of many international jurists, the 2003 Iraq War was considered a serious violation of the global legal order. Figures such as Lord Bingham, one of the highest judicial authorities in Britain, explicitly deemed the war a "serious violation of international law," as there was neither a Security Council mandate nor verifiable proof of an imminent threat. Academic studies have also emphasized that the legal arguments presented to justify the war—including preemptive defense—lacked a valid basis, and accepting them could undermine the fundamental principles prohibiting the use of force.
Alongside these legal discussions, subsequent revelations provided a clearer picture of how the war was conceived. Documents and investigations showed that claims regarding weapons of mass destruction, cited as the primary justification for war, were either exaggerated or fundamentally false. Even within British public opinion, the perception became widespread that the government had engaged in "distortion and exaggeration of intelligence" on the path to justifying war. Furthermore, confidential documents revealed that the decision for war had been largely made before the full exhaustion of diplomatic and legal channels, and the possibility of an attack without Security Council authorization had been contemplated from the outset.
However, what turned this case into a turning point was not merely the occurrence of the war, but the subsequent absence of any effective accountability. Neither at the national nor international level did a mechanism emerge to seriously hold the principal decision-makers responsible. Even in specific instances of human rights violations, such as cases concerning the mistreatment of detainees, efforts were observed to prevent the involvement of independent judicial bodies, including the International Criminal Court. This process effectively cemented the message that major powers could enter and exit wars without incurring a legal cost.
This "accountability void" gradually transformed into a behavioral pattern in international politics. As some Western analysts have emphasized in recent years, the shadow of the Iraq War still looms over today's decisions, and politicians have repeatedly warned against "repeating the mistakes of that era." But the fundamental difference is that warnings have not replaced accountability. Consequently, what should have served as a deterrent lesson instead became a cost-free precedent.
It is in this context that Middle East Eye's analysis gains meaning: When a war of that scale of destruction concludes without the punishment of its initiators, why should we expect the pattern not to be repeated? Experience shows that impunity directly influences the calculations of decision-makers. When there is no legal cost, the military option not only remains on the agenda but becomes one of the ordinary tools of foreign policy.
This pattern can be clearly observed in subsequent developments, including in Gaza and in confrontational policies against Iran. In Gaza, the continuation of widespread attacks on civilian areas and the destruction of infrastructure have once again called into question the efficacy of international humanitarian law.
The core question is this: If clear violations of these rules carry no serious consequences for decision-makers, what factor can prevent their recurrence?
In this context, Benjamin Netanyahu's role in directing Israel's military policies and the continuation of hardline approaches, as well as Donald Trump's role in escalating confrontational policies against Iran—including the withdrawal from the nuclear deal, the imposition of maximum pressure, and subsequently military aggression against Iran—can be analyzed within this very framework of impunity. These actions have not occurred in a vacuum, but in a context that had previously demonstrated that costly war decisions are not necessarily accompanied by legal costs for the decision-makers.
The key point here is the link between "accountability" and "deterrence." Contrary to the common perception that reduces deterrence solely to military power, the Iraq experience shows that legal deterrence—meaning the real possibility of trial and punishment—can play a more decisive role in preventing war. If leaders knew their decisions might place them before international courts, their calculations would fundamentally change. Conversely, if they know such an outcome is unlikely, the threshold for deciding to go to war is drastically lowered.
Ultimately, if global peace is to be transformed from a moral aspiration into a political reality, a fundamental principle must be revived: ending impunity. The Iraq experience demonstrated that war remaining cost-free itself becomes an incentive for subsequent wars. Today, this rule remains in effect. Figures such as Netanyahu and Trump, under this very logic, should face legal mechanisms for their roles in escalating violence in Gaza and against Iran.
Otherwise, history will simply repeat itself. If the architects of past wars remain unaccountable, the architects of future wars will act with even greater audacity. And in such a world, peace will not only be unattainable, but will recede further from the horizon of international politics with each passing day.
MNA
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