A war that was supposed to weaken Iran and place Iranian society against the country's political system has become a factor in strengthening national solidarity and changing Washington's calculations.
The Iranian nation, contrary to the assumption of the architects of maximum pressure, has distinguished between criticism of certain domestic issues and defending the country against foreign aggression; a distinction whose neglect can lead to the failure of strategies that have bet on the erosion of Iran's internal cohesion.
The American publication Foreign Affairs, in an analysis titled "The Theory of Iran's Victory," addresses this very issue and explains that military attacks and economic pressures, contrary to initial expectations, have not been able to realize the strategic objectives of America and the Zionist regime. This analysis states that the Iranian people do not see the war of America and Israel as liberating. Instead, they consider it an unjustified aggression, and the nationalism resulting from it has blurred the boundaries of political factions and reduced the possibility of another political uprising taking shape. This war has strengthened the Islamic Republic.
The importance of this assessment lies in the fact that the outcome of a confrontation cannot be measured solely on the basis of the extent of military damage, the destruction of infrastructure, or economic pressures. In strategic calculations, society and the people's reaction to the crisis also play a determining role. A country may face serious economic difficulties and parts of its infrastructure may be damaged, but this situation does not necessarily mean political defeat or the collapse of its national cohesion. Especially when the people consider the main cause of the crisis to be not internal disputes, but foreign attack and the threat to their country's existence.
The Gap Between Domestic Dissatisfaction and Reaction to Foreign Aggression
One of Washington's miscalculations is ignoring the difference between social and economic dissatisfactions in Iran and society's reaction to a foreign military attack. Dissatisfaction with living conditions, political demands, and criticism of officials' performance are realities that cannot be denied; but from the existence of these demands, one cannot conclude that Iranian society will move in the very direction that the architects of pressure expect in the face of any foreign pressure.
In fact, foreign pressure can change society's priorities. When people feel that their security, independence, or territorial integrity is under threat, they may temporarily marginalize internal disputes and make the defense of the country their common priority. This reaction does not necessarily mean the disappearance of all disputes or the end of criticisms; rather, it shows that national identity and sensitivity toward the country's independence have a capacity independent of political disputes.
From this perspective, the expectation that bombardments and economic pressure will automatically lead to protests against Iran's political structure is based on an incomplete understanding of Iranian society. Such an expectation reduces the people to a variable subordinate to military pressure, as if the more economic and human costs increase, the more likely society is to align with the objectives of the aggressor side. Whereas in many situations, a foreign attack can lead to strengthening the sense of a common threat and increasing the distance between the target society and the aggressors.
Why Does Foreign Pressure Produce the Opposite Result?
Economic and military pressure can lead to the political changes desired by its architects only when there is a reliable relationship between the pressure exerted and the expected political result. But this relationship is neither certain nor does it operate in the same way in all societies. Sanctions may increase people's living costs, disrupt economic activity, and exert pressure on various segments of society; however, whether these pressures lead to the weakening of the government, the strengthening of opponents, or an increase in national solidarity depends on numerous factors.
One of these factors is society's perception of the purpose of the pressures. If people imagine that foreign actions are being carried out with the aim of improving their living conditions, they may show a different reaction than when they consider these actions an attempt to impose political will or weaken their country. When a military attack is accompanied by widespread threats against infrastructure and national capacities, this perception is strengthened that the issue is not merely a dispute with a government, but that the matter is related to the country's security and future.
The Foreign Affairs analysis also emphasizes this same change in the social atmosphere. According to this assessment, foreign attacks, instead of turning existing political fissures into a factor for widespread instability, have at times paved the way for strengthening nationalism and removing factional boundaries. This process shows that external pressure, contrary to the assumption of some American policymakers, does not lead to the weakening of national will and may even increase the motivation to defend the country among groups that had serious disagreements with one another before the crisis.
The Nation: A Determining Variable in the Outcome of the Confrontation
National power is not limited to weapons capability, economic capacities, or the extent of access to advanced technologies. A society's ability to maintain cohesion under crisis conditions is also considered part of a country's power. A country that can preserve social bonds and a sense of national responsibility against external pressure possesses a capacity that purely military calculations are unable to fully explain.
In this context, the role of the Iranian nation must also be examined within the framework of this country's historical experience. Sensitivity toward independence, foreign interference, and attempts to impose the will of great powers has been among the important issues in shaping Iranians' political memory. This background does not mean that all people have the same view on domestic issues or foreign policy; rather, it shows that under conditions in which an external threat becomes prominent, national belonging can become a point of common ground for groups that have many disagreements under normal conditions.
Of course, the strengthening of national solidarity during a crisis should not be taken to mean the permanent elimination of social demands or the resolution of economic problems. Livelihood pressures can still affect people's lives, and after the external threat subsides, domestic demands will again become prominent. However, this very distinction shows that domestic dissatisfactions cannot be used as a definitive tool for advancing foreign military and political objectives. A society that is critical of its officials' performance does not necessarily want foreign military intervention or the weakening of its country.
For American policymakers, the message of this reality is clear: understanding Iranian society without paying attention to national identity, historical experience, and its sensitivity toward independence will lead to incomplete assessments. Relying on the assumption that increased pressure will automatically change the people's political will in the direction desired by Washington can make that very policymaker heedless of the real consequences of his decisions.
Ultimately, assessing the success or failure of a strategy against Iran is not possible merely through the number of attacks, the extent of damages, or the severity of sanctions. One must see what political and social results these measures have produced and whether they have been able to steer society toward the objectives declared by their designers or not. What the Foreign Affairs analysis highlights is the gap between America's expectation and the reaction of Iranian society. Ignoring the role of the nation is considered one of the most important weaknesses of these calculations, because external pressure is not only not a guarantee for the collapse of internal cohesion, but under certain conditions can lead to the opposite result and strengthen the national will to defend the country.
MNA
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