Washington and Tel Aviv formed a coalition to launch an unprovoked coordinated military attack against Iran on February 28, 2026, targeting leadership, nuclear, military, and civilian sites across the country. The aggression prompted immediate and sustained retaliatory strikes by the Iranian Armed Forces against the Israeli and American interests in the region. The war has resulted in 3,375 identified fatalities within Iran, with ordinary civilians being a significant number of them.
After weeks of hostilities, a fragile two-week truce was brokered by Pakistan and took effect on April 10, hailed by Tehran as an “Iranian victory” based on its 10-point peace framework. However, subsequent direct talks in Islamabad between the Iranian and American delegations, headed by U.S. Vice President JD Vance and Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, ended without reaching a peace deal on April 12 after 21 hours. Washington’s “excessive demands” regarding the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear program were cited by the Iranian sources as the principal points of contention.
In order to shed more light on the dimensions of the war, Mehr News Agency reached out to Giuliano Bifolchi, Research Manager & OSINT Unit Director at SpecialEurasia.
Regarding the nature of the conflict and the miscalculations made by Washington and Tel Aviv, Bifolchi stressed that Iran’s confrontation with the United States and Israel has exposed a series of misjudgments in Western and Israeli assessments of Tehran’s military capabilities. Iran has demonstrated that it can design and execute complex strike packages capable of saturating advanced air‑defence systems, challenging long‑standing assumptions about Israeli technological superiority and US regional dominance.
"Its ability to inflict substantial damage on Israeli infrastructure has shifted the tactical balance in that bilateral exchange, revealing vulnerabilities in Israel’s defensive architecture. The dynamic with the United States is more asymmetric: Iran has repeatedly struck US bases and highlighted Washington’s difficulty in fully protecting its regional partners, yet the United States remains strategically insulated because the conflict does not reach its own territory. This structural advantage allows Washington to absorb regional instability without suffering direct domestic consequences, whereas Iran, Israel, and [Persian–MNA] Gulf states bear the immediate human and infrastructural costs."
"Despite Iran’s operational successes, the conflict has significantly affected its own civilian infrastructure, energy production, and societal resilience. The broader impact extends beyond the immediate battlefield. The disruption of logistics corridors, energy routes, and major infrastructural projects is reshaping the Eurasian geopolitical landscape, undermining connectivity initiatives and complicating the strategic calculations of external powers. The conflict, while geographically contained, is generating long‑term consequences for regional stability and the wider Eurasian system.”
In response to a question about his opinion on whether Israel and the United States have succeeded in achieving their declared objectives in the war against Iran, he said, “The record of success and failure for the United States and Israel in the confrontation with Iran is mixed and does not align neatly with the objectives initially articulated by Washington. Public statements at the outset of the crisis suggested ambitions to weaken Iran strategically, constrain its regional influence, and generate internal pressure that might erode the cohesion of the Islamic Republic. None of these aims has been realised decisively. Despite internal unrest earlier in the year, Iran has not fragmented. Instead, the conflict has reinforced domestic cohesion by creating a rally-round-the-flag effect, as people perceive an external existential threat. This outcome runs counter to expectations that sustained pressure would deepen internal fractures or a so-called “regime change”.
"The Iranian nuclear programme remains a central obstacle to any diplomatic accommodation. The confrontation has made it even less likely that Tehran would consider abandoning its nuclear ambitions. From an analytical standpoint, it is difficult to identify any incentive that would push Iran to dismantle its programme after weathering a conflict of this scale. The nuclear file has become intertwined with national survival, and the crisis has reinforced Iranian perceptions that strategic deterrence is indispensable."
"Israel, for its part, is facing a level of military pressure that its population and political leadership did not expect. The scale of damage inflicted on Israeli infrastructure, combined with operational setbacks in Lebanon, has altered regional perceptions of Israeli military dominance. These developments have weakened the aura of deterrence that Israel has relied upon for decades, and they have raised questions among regional actors about the reliability of Israeli and Western assessments of Iranian capabilities."
"In the broader geopolitical context, the United States appears to be achieving some indirect strategic effects, even if its immediate military objectives remain ambiguous. The conflict has disrupted not only Iran and the [Persian–MNA] Gulf states but also the wider region. China, which depends heavily on Iranian energy supplies and maritime stability for its Belt and Road maritime routes, faces increased strategic risk. Europe, already under economic strain, is exposed to further instability should the conflict persist, with potential consequences for energy security, trade flows, and internal political cohesion. These secondary effects align with long‑standing US interests in shaping the strategic environment in ways that complicate the rise of rival powers."
"Nevertheless, the military dimension of the conflict remains unresolved. The definitive end-state desired by Washington and Tel Aviv is not well-defined, particularly considering the ongoing discrepancy between Western media portrayals and the observable reality of Iran’s demonstrated capacities. Iran’s continued ability to strike regional actors and US facilities contradicts claims that Tehran had exhausted its military assets. This discrepancy underscores the difficulty of assessing Iranian resilience and raises questions about the strategic clarity of the US‑Israeli approach.”
"In response to a question about Iran's projection of power by controlling the Strait of Hormuz and also regional allies joining it to pressure the aggressor, the Italian expert noted, “Iran’s current approach reflects a strategy it had signalled well before the outbreak of the confrontation. By relying on calibrated escalation, the mobilisation of the Axis of Resistance, and the use of missile and drone capabilities to impose costs on adversaries, Tehran has pursued a model designed to deter large‑scale intervention while avoiding a direct, full‑spectrum war. The key variable remains the United States. The central question is whether Washington is prepared to escalate to ground or major naval operations. At present, there is no sign that the United States intends to undertake such a step, and this restraint has allowed Iran’s strategy to remain effective within its intended parameters.
In response to a question about the solution to end the war – given US insistence on excessive demands and Iran's refusal to give up its fundamental rights – he said, “Forecasting the trajectory of the conflict remains difficult, as multiple moving variables shape the situation and because none of the parties has yet defined a clear or stable end‑state. For the moment, channels of communication remain open, and all sides appear willing to test whether a negotiated arrangement is possible. However, the risk of renewed confrontation remains high, particularly once the initial two-week ceasefire expires. The most immediate flashpoints lie along the Israel–Lebanon axis, though a broader escalation involving Israel, the United States, and Iran cannot be excluded if deterrence fails or if one party interprets the post‑ceasefire environment as an opportunity to regain leverage.
Domestic political dynamics in the United States add a layer of uncertainty. Reporting in US media has noted that the conflict is influencing the internal political climate, and analysts are watching closely to see how developments may affect the administration’s decision-making space. This factor complicates the diplomatic landscape, as each party is aware that Washington’s posture may shift depending on domestic pressures and political calculations.
The core strategic obstacle remains the Iranian nuclear issue. The parties hold fundamentally different objectives, and this divergence limits the scope for compromise. A key question is whether the United States will judge the military outcomes achieved so far as sufficient, particularly given the wider international reaction and the economic consequences of the US‑imposed blockade on the Strait of Hormuz. That blockade has direct implications for China, Southeast Asia, and Europe, all of which depend on stable maritime energy flows. The international response to these disruptions will shape whether states move closer to Washington, closer to Tehran, or pursue independent strategies aimed at insulating themselves from the consequences of regional escalation.
Given these dynamics, the most realistic assessment is that clarity will only emerge once the ceasefire concludes. At that point, it will become clear whether the region is entering another cycle of airstrikes and retaliatory operations or whether the parties will continue to engage diplomatically despite the unresolved strategic gaps.”
Interview by Mohaddeseh Pakravan
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