Amid unprecedented civilian casualties and a deepening humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, questions about the effectiveness of the international legal order have become more urgent than ever. In this interview, Leila Ramazannejad, a specialist in international law, explains how the repeated use of the U.S. veto has pushed the UN Security Council into “institutional paralysis,” why ICC arrest warrants remain unenforced, and which legal pathways, if any, still offer realistic prospects for accountability. Her analysis sheds light on the structural deficiencies, political inequalities, and legal constraints that have left the global system unable to halt clear and ongoing violations of international law.
Here is the full text of the interview;
Given the repeated use of the veto by the United States to block resolutions related to ceasefires or humanitarian assistance, what are the implications for the legitimacy and effectiveness of the UN Security Council under international law and the UN Charter? Can this trend be described as “institutional paralysis”?
Under Article 27 of the UN Charter, substantive decisions of the Security Council require nine affirmative votes, including the concurrence of all five permanent members (P5). This voting system, commonly known as the veto, was designed as a political concession to ensure the participation of the World War II victors in the system of collective security.
Legally speaking, the Charter explicitly recognizes the veto as legitimate; however, legal legitimacy alone does not guarantee normative or moral legitimacy. According to a classical distinction, legitimacy requires social acceptance and a perception of fairness in institutional behavior, not merely conformity to legal text.
When the veto is used to obstruct humanitarian action, ceasefires, or the delivery of aid during human crises (as seen in Syria, Gaza, or Ukraine), it constitutes a violation of the spirit of the Charter. Article 1(1) clearly defines the organization's primary purpose as maintaining international peace and security on the basis of justice and respect for international law. Thus, the repeated use of the veto to prevent humanitarian assistance is inconsistent with the Charter’s core objectives and undermines the Council’s normative legitimacy.
In theory, institutional effectiveness in international organizations depends on their ability to make decisions, fulfill their mandate, and maintain the trust of states. With the increasing number of politically motivated US vetoes concerning Palestine or Ukraine, the Council gradually loses its capacity for collective action and faces what organizational theory calls institutional paralysis.
Institutional paralysis arises when decision-making rules are structured in such a way that a small minority of actors can neutralize the will of the majority. As a result, what emerges is a “Security Council unable to provide security.”
The direct consequences of this condition include: A decline in the Council’s political and moral legitimacy, particularly among Global South countries, which perceive it as an instrument of Western powers, a strengthened role for the General Assembly through alternative mechanisms such as
the Uniting for Peace resolution or emergency special sessions, used in cases like the Korean War and Russia’s attack on Ukraine, and an increased resort to regional or coalition-based mechanisms for crisis management outside the Charter framework (e.g., NATO, the African Union, or the European Union).
From the standpoint of contemporary international law, the United States does not violate the procedural rules of the Charter by repeatedly using the veto. However, it does violate the spirit and objectives of the Charter, ultimately contributing to the erosion of the principle of collective security.
Legal recommendations to overcome institutional paralysis include:
Reforming the veto system by restricting its scope in cases involving mass atrocities and grave human rights violations (as proposed in the France–Mexico initiative on limiting the veto in atrocity situations).
Enhancing Council accountability by requiring permanent members to provide written and public justification for each veto.
Strengthening the General Assembly as a moral authority and alternative mechanism for collective action under Resolution 377A(V).
At a time when the Security Council is unable to make effective decisions to stop a war or ensure humanitarian access due to the veto, what alternative institutions or mechanisms can partially compensate for this gap?
The second question is very precise and goes to the heart of the debates on the effectiveness of the collective security system when the Security Council is deadlocked. In situations where the veto prevents the Council from taking effective action, the international community has several formal and informal alternative pathways. Although these mechanisms do not have the same binding force or authority as the Security Council, they can, in practice, compensate for part of the institutional vacuum. The most important of these include:
1. The UN General Assembly (Uniting for Peace / Emergency Special Sessions)
Under the well-known Resolution 377 A(V), adopted in 1950 and referred to as Uniting for Peace, when the Security Council is unable to act due to the veto, the General Assembly can convene an emergency special session; recommend collective measures, including sanctions or even the use of force, to maintain or restore international peace; or keep the political and diplomatic track alive and mobilize global public opinion.
2. The Human Rights Council and its Special Mechanisms
The Council can establish fact-finding missions or Commissions of Inquiry. The resulting reports often serve as a basis for prosecutions before international judicial bodies such as the ICC or special courts.
Although these mechanisms lack direct enforcement power, they play a crucial role in shaping the “legal narrative” and applying diplomatic pressure.
3. Regional Organizations (under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter)
Such as the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), the Arab League, or the Organization of American States (OAS).
These bodies can engage in regional dispute-settlement mechanisms and may even deploy regional peacekeeping missions.
4. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) and its Advisory Jurisdiction
While the ICJ cannot carry out enforcement operations, its advisory opinions or binding judgments between states provide legal grounding and international legitimacy for subsequent actions by other institutions.
5. The International Criminal Court (ICC)
In cases involving major international crimes (genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, or aggression) the ICC Prosecutor may act even without a Security Council referral, provided that the territorial state or the nationality of the perpetrators falls under the Rome Statute.
When the Security Council remains silent, ICC proceedings can still bring key perpetrators under investigation.
6. Humanitarian and Multilateral Mediation Mechanisms
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), UN humanitarian agencies (OCHA, WFP, WHO), and traditionally neutral mediating states (such as Switzerland or Qatar) can create operational structures for humanitarian access or temporary ceasefires.
These mechanisms operate primarily on humanitarian principles beyond political considerations.
7. Coalition-based or unilateral actions under the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P)
In cases of mass atrocity crimes and Security Council paralysis, some states or coalitions may intervene autonomously and justify the moral legitimacy of their actions on the basis of R2P.
To sum up, when the Security Council is paralyzed, alternative mechanisms operate across three layers: global, regional, and humanitarian.
It is the combination of these instruments that can partially compensate for the absence of binding Security Council decisions by providing normative guidance, political pressure, and facilitating humanitarian access.
Despite the arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for the Israeli prime minister, why has the implementation of this warrant reached a deadlock? Where does the weakness in the enforcement mechanism of international judgments originate?
You have raised a very precise and highly legal question—one that is certainly asked by many law students as well. This is an issue that lies exactly at the intersection of international criminal law and the law of international organizations, and it must be explained structurally in several steps:
1. Why the Enforcement Deadlock Exists
Lack of an Independent Enforcement Body (Structural Deficiency)
The ICC has no police force or independent enforcement mechanism. Its arrest warrants can only be executed through member states.
Under Article 89 of the Rome Statute, states parties are obligated to arrest and surrender the accused. However: Israel is not a party to the Rome Statute; The United States and some of its allies are also not parties, or have withdrawn; and even some member states (such as several European countries) delay or avoid enforcement against Israeli officials for political reasons.
As a result, without state cooperation, an arrest warrant is effectively unenforceable.
2. Political Considerations and the Use of the Veto
Although the ICC is formally independent, the Security Council can refer cases to the Court under Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute or suspend investigations under Article 16. In this context: The US veto prevents any collective action within the UN system that could facilitate enforcement of the arrest warrant against Israeli officials; and even beyond the UN, member states avoid execution of the warrant due to political pressure.
3. Conflict Between “Head-of-State Immunity” and International Criminal Justice
While the ICC explicitly states (Article 27) that official capacity does not shield an individual from prosecution, many states still maintain domestic rules granting immunity to sitting heads of state.
Thus, national authorities generally refrain from arresting a foreign prime minister or head of state in order to avoid diplomatic fallout.
4. Double Standards in the Enforcement of International Justice
The ICC has faced the same situation in cases such as Omar al-Bashir (Sudan): arrest warrants were issued, but even state parties refused to execute them.
In contrast, in cases involving weaker or primarily African states, enforcement has occurred more swiftly—fueling criticism of selective justice.
5. Structural Roots of the Weakness in International Enforcement
Institutional: There is no enforcement arm for any international court. The international system lacks a “central government,” and implementation depends entirely on state cooperation.
Legal: State sovereignty and head-of-state immunity remain central principles. No international institution can exercise coercive power without the consent or membership of states.
Political: The influence of powerful states over international organizations, particularly the United States’ support for Israel, blocks any meaningful enforcement.
Structural (Power Distribution): The imbalance of power within the Security Council, especially the veto power, prevents transforming ICC cases into binding, enforceable obligations.
In conclusion, the deadlock in enforcing the ICC arrest warrant for the Israeli prime minister is not the result of a legal flaw in the warrant itself, but rather the product of the lack of an enforcement mechanism in the international system, the political domination of powerful states, and the primacy of political interests over global criminal justice.
Within the logic of “classical international law,” states remain the primary and independent actors. As long as the international community has not moved toward a supranational authority with binding powers, the judgments of international courts will continue to possess symbolic rather than coercive value.
Given the extensive reports of civilian casualties and the severe humanitarian crisis in Gaza, even after the announcement and initiation of a ceasefire, what legal avenues exist to hold the parties involved accountable at the international level? Which pathway is realistically the most effective?
This question pertains to international accountability in the post-ceasefire phase in Gaza, that is, when active hostilities appear to have stopped, yet the consequences of violations (civilian casualties, blockade, and the humanitarian crisis) continue. At this stage, the applicable legal mechanisms differ from those used during active conflict and shift toward documentation, attribution of responsibility, and reparations. Below are the main pathways and an assessment of their realistic effectiveness:
1. The International Criminal Court (ICC)
Legal Basis: Articles 13 and 15 of the Rome Statute (jurisdiction by referral or proprio motu).
Status: The Prosecutor has formally opened an investigation concerning the Situation in Palestine (covering events since 13 June 2014).
Strength: The ICC is the only permanent international court with jurisdiction over core international crimes (war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide).
Challenges: Israel and the United States are not parties to the Rome Statute. Enforcement of arrest warrants depends entirely on state cooperation. And political pressure and threats of sanctions against ICC members undermine effectiveness.
Realistic Outlook: In the short term, enforcement is unlikely; however, in the long run the ICC investigation can create a solid legal record of violations and restrict international travel for Israeli officials.
2. The International Court of Justice (ICJ)
Legal Basis: State-to-state responsibility (not individual criminal responsibility).
Example: South Africa’s case against Israel under the Genocide Convention (2023–2024).
Potential Outcome: Provisional measures (as already issued) followed by a binding final judgment determining breaches of international obligations.
Challenges: Enforcement requires political will and, at times, Security Council involvement. And the process is lengthy.
Effectiveness: Although lacking material enforcement, the ICJ is one of the most powerful mechanisms for formally establishing violations, providing a foundation for follow-up actions such as sanctions, diplomatic measures, or compensation.
3. The UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC)
Tool: The Independent International Commission of Inquiry (COI) on the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
Capabilities: Documenting violations, identifying perpetrators, and reporting to the General Assembly and Security Council. As well as conducting investigations without Israel’s consent.
Realistic Effectiveness: While not a judicial body, it is highly influential in generating admissible evidence for the ICC or national courts; currently, it is one of the most effective mechanisms in the post-ceasefire context.
4. Universal Jurisdiction in National Courts
Legal Basis: The principle of universal jurisdiction for grave international crimes (as applied in Spain, Germany, Belgium, etc.).
Strength: Allows domestic courts to issue arrest warrants or prosecute Israeli officials if they travel abroad.
Challenges: Dependent on domestic political will.
Realistic Effectiveness: Despite being fragmented, it is among the most immediate and practical legal threats for individual perpetrators, demonstrated in precedents from Syria and Myanmar.
5. The UN General Assembly (Uniting for Peace)
Authority: When the Security Council is paralyzed due to vetoes, the General Assembly can adopt politically binding recommendations and establish special committees for investigation or compensation.
Effectiveness: While legally limited, it exerts strong symbolic and political pressure and can lay the groundwork for mechanisms such as humanitarian compensation funds.
Realistically, the most effective accountability pathway is a combined strategy is the most feasible and impactful under current conditions: rely on the UNHRC’s Independent Commission of Inquiry (COI) for systematic and formal documentation; feed this evidence into ongoing ICC investigations and reinforce the prosecutorial record, and Pursue universal jurisdiction cases in European and Latin American courts to target individual perpetrators directly.
Together with sustained political support for ICJ proceedings, this multi-channel approach offers the best prospect for achieving meaningful judicial accountability for Gaza in the medium term.
Despite the declared ceasefire, Israel continues its attacks on Gaza and is effectively violating its commitments. Under such circumstances, which international legal body should intervene, and why is there no effective mechanism to stop this clear violation?
The final and most difficult question is both timely and precise, as it directly addresses the structural weakness of the international legal order: the absence of enforcement mechanisms and the imbalance of political power among states.
To answer comprehensively, the potential levels of intervention must be examined separately:
1. International bodies with the authority to intervene
Given the current situation (violation of the ceasefire, ongoing civilian casualties, and the continuation of the humanitarian blockade), several international legal institutions possess potential responsibility:
The UN Security Council:
It is the primary body responsible for maintaining international peace and security, with the power to issue binding resolutions, impose sanctions, and deploy peacekeeping forces.
In practice, however, it is paralyzed due to the U.S. veto in support of Israel.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ):
It can issue binding provisional measures and final judgments in disputes between states, as seen in the case brought by South Africa against Israel.
But the ICJ has no enforcement power, and compliance ultimately depends on the Security Council.
The International Criminal Court (ICC):
It prosecutes individuals responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity and can issue arrest warrants for political and military leaders.
Yet Israel and the United States are not parties to the Rome Statute, and enforcement depends entirely on cooperation from states.
The UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC):
It monitors human rights violations and establishes fact-finding missions or special rapporteurs. Howecer, its powers are limited to reporting and recommending, it has no coercive authority.
The UN General Assembly:
It represents the collective conscience of the international community and can activate the “Uniting for Peace” mechanism.
While it cannot enforce decisions, it generates significant moral and political legitimacy.
2. Why is there no effective enforcement mechanism?
Structurally: International law is still founded on state sovereignty, not on supranational enforcement. The UN has no independent executive force, and implementation relies entirely on state cooperation.
Politically: The U.S. veto enables Washington to block any binding collective action against Israel.
Legally: Even when bodies such as the ICJ or ICC issue binding rulings, their enforcement requires state compliance. Without cooperation, no international authority can impose compliance.
Institutionally: The international system lacks a true separation of powers: judicial institutions (ICJ, ICC) remain structurally dependent on the executive arm (the Security Council), which is driven by political interests.
3. What partial mechanisms still exist?
Despite the lack of comprehensive enforcement, several limited but potentially impactful avenues remain:
Continued submission of reports from the UN Human Rights Council’s Commission of Inquiry to the ICC to strengthen the evidentiary foundation of ongoing investigations.
Activation of the “Uniting for Peace” mechanism in the General Assembly to circumvent Security Council paralysis and build a framework of collective political response.
Use of universal jurisdiction in domestic courts of third states (such as Spain, South Africa, Belgium, Nrway) to prosecute individuals responsible for violations.
Coordinated economic and diplomatic pressure from coalitions of states and civil society, including the suspension of arms trade and military cooperation.
Under Articles 2(4) and 39 of the UN Charter and the rules of international humanitarian law, continuing attacks after a declared ceasefire constitute a serious violation of customary international law.
Yet because the current global system places power politics above justice, there is no effective enforcement mechanism.
In short, ceasefire without enforcement, in a world defined by unequal power, becomes the quietest casualty of justice.
Interview by Mohaddeseh Pakravan
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