The developments in the Middle East over the past year have been rapid and surprising. One of these surprises is the friendship between two former rivals. The Syrian transitional president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, held a meeting with the commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Mazloum Abdi.
On Monday, March 10th, 2025, the parties agreed where the Syrian Kurds officially abandoned their pursuit of independence and joined the new government.
The clauses of this agreement include:
SDF civilian and military institutions to be integrated into the new state.
Airports and oil fields in the northeast will go under the al-Shaara regime’s control.
Recognising the Kurdish component as an integral part of the Syrian state and guaranteeing its citizenship rights and all constitutional entitlements.
Implementation in all Syrian territories.
Ensuring the rights of all Syrians to the political process and participation in all government institutions based on efficiency and merit, regardless of religion or sectarian background.
Ensuring the return of all Syrian refugees to their cities and villages and ensuring their security by the Syrian government.
Supporting the Syrian government in its fight against elements of the “remnants of Bashar al-Assad’s regime” and all threats that endanger its security and unity.
This report examines the reasons for this agreement between al-Sharaa and Abdi, as well as its geopolitical implications for Syria and the West Asian region.
Why did the Kurds agree to work with Syria’s new government?
The Syrian Kurds and extremist Islamist groups fought against each other during the Syrian civil war. The two sides had no political, ideological, or cultural similarities. The Kurds’ decision to cooperate with the new Syrian government, despite its leadership’s ties to the extremist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), stems from several factors.
US withdrawal from north-eastern Syria. Five years later, after returning to the White House, Trump has doubled down on his “America First” stance, arguing that Syria is not the US fight. On February 5th, 2025, Trump and officials close to him asked about pulling all US troops out of Syria, prompting the Pentagon to draw up plans for a full withdrawal in 30, 60 , or 90 days. During the years of the civil war, the Syrian Kurds could achieve a significant position in the country’s northeast, thanks to US military and political support. But with the changing patterns of US presence in the region and Washington moving towards a compromise with Ahmed al-Sharaa, the Kurds are now under pressure to abandon their independent vis-à-vis Turkey and Damascus and enter the structure of the central Syrian government.
Ocalan’s statement and the disarmament of the PKK. The agreement between the new Syrian government and the Kurds comes approximately two weeks after a historic message from Abdullah Ocalan, founder of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), calling for the militant group to lie down its arms and disband. Disarmament of the PKK in Turkey means the dissolution of the group and the Syrian Kurds will lose one of their most important supporters. In fact, Ocalan’s statement as the main ideologist of the Rojava Autonomous Administration means the end of the ideology of »Democratic Confederalism« that was formed in northeastern Syria. The PKK, as one of the oldest Kurdish movements, has reached a stage where, if not completely dissolved in the future, it will at least experience a change in its nature and intellectual and structural transformation. The decision of the PKK leader has also influenced the SDF and the Syrian Kurdish militias.
Dissatisfaction and lack of support from Arab tribes in the northeast region. Tribalism is the primary form of collective identity among Arab Sunnis throughout Syria, regardless of whether they live in rural or urban areas. Tribes are a powerful source of socio-political mobilization. Syrian Arab tribes live in the east, northeast, centre, and southeast. Some of these tribes are also present in the Jazira region and the provinces of Al-Hasakah, Raqqa, and Deir Ezzor. Some of these tribes, especially in areas where most of the population is Arab, oppose Kurdish rule. Critics have raised this issue as one of the most important weaknesses of Kurdish rule. In recent years, the Autonomous Administration’s forces and Arab tribes have clashed violently numerous times, and the two have repeatedly redrawn border areas. The emphasis on Kurdish ideals has caused Arab tribes to find no benefit and no place for their Arabic language and identity within the borders of Rojava. Those tribal leaders who previously collaborated with the Assad government and Iran to eliminate the Syrian Democratic Forces are now supporting Damascus. The new al-Sharaa government and Turkey encouraged most Arab tribes to oppose the Kurds, spurring them into armed rebellion. The SDF did not have the support of the Arabs in the north-eastern region.
Economic and livelihood problems in Rojava. The Syrian civil war, Turkish military attacks on the SDF, the closure of crossings and the confinement of the Kurds to a specific geography, the inability to sell oil, unemployment, drought, and the reduction of economic aid from Europe and the United States in recent years have all caused the Kurds to face numerous economic problems. Previously, the Bashar al-Assad government, the areas under the control of the opposition, and Iraqi Kurdistan, had purchased oil from them at low prices, which also destroyed this source of income. The SDF needed economic resources to survive, but there was no prospect of it.
The Impact of the agreement on Syria and region
The agreement represents three wins for Damascus. First, the government in Damascus establishes their territorial and political control and their recognition as Syria’s legitimate government. The second aspect is the economic win as the deal grants Damascus access to the oil and gas revenues in the east of Syria, which is quite significant in the greater scheme of things. Third, For Syrian leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, the deal is a way to demonstrate stability and reassure the West of his commitment to protecting minorities.
One of the most important effects of this agreement is that it can be a model for interaction with other Syrian minorities, such as Alawites, Christians and Druze. The future of political stability looks bright if this agreement succeeds. Otherwise, political stability in Syria will undergo various developments for years.
Although the terms of this agreement are general and its implementation is currently unclear, the current situation has largely been in Turkey’s favour and is seen as an achievement for Ankara. This situation is exploitable at both the regional and Turkish domestic political levels. Erdogan and the Justice and Development Party can present these recent achievements as a strong point in future election campaigns. These developments may also advance policies related to peace with the Kurds. The new deal grants Kurds recognition as a Syrian ethnic group and promises them a degree of autonomy concerning their language and identity. This issue could also have significant implications for the PKK’s future negotiations with Erdogan regarding Turkey’s Kurds.
Iran and Israel likely viewed this agreement unfavourably, as the Kurds could have served as a counterweight to Erdogan’s power and Syrian involvement. However, the lack of implementation guarantees, domestic or international, and the limited information about behind-the-scenes developments among all involved parties, various actors, such as Israel, Turkey, Iran, Russia, France, and Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, and the interim government itself could push for modifications.
Conclusion
For survival, all groups, particularly those advocating independence, require a robust ideology, domestic and international support, economic resources, and strong leadership. The SDF has gradually lost all of these in recent years.
The loss of economic resources, Abdullah Ocalan’s abandonment of his ideological position, the practical failure of “Democratic Confederalism,” and the changing conditions in the Middle East and Syria have led to the withdrawal of domestic and international support for the group.
The combined repressive force of a united Turkey and Syrian transition government would completely destroy Kurdish culture and politics. Therefore, it is natural that they seek to get out of this situation with fewer costs. In the current situation, the Kurds have contented themselves with obtaining cultural and political privileges from the new government. Although these political and cultural privileges may seem insufficient and come at the cost of losing the autonomy of the “Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria”, it should not be forgotten that during the 60-year rule of the Baath Party in Syria, the Kurds were not even recognised as an ethnic minority.
Ultimately, the future will show whether this agreement will truly lead to integrating the Kurds into the structure of a “Syrian national” state, or whether it was merely an attempt to marginalise the Kurdish forces and limit their capabilities in the face of pressure from Turkey and the Damascus-Ankara axis. For now, the deal reflects a pragmatic, albeit precarious, survival strategy in an uncertain future.
Source: SpecialEurasia
MNA/
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