Apr 21, 2026, 3:22 PM

Misreading Tehran: Culture, history, and collapse of coercion

Misreading Tehran: Culture, history, and collapse of coercion

TEHRAN, Apr. 21 (MNA) – A millennia-old civilization doesn't bend to ultimatums. Trump's miscalculation was mistaking Iran's strategic patience for vulnerability.

Understanding Iran's behavior in the realm of foreign policy is practically impossible without a deep comprehension of the link between culture, history, and strategy. This is precisely the point at which many American policymakers, and particularly Donald Trump, have made a miscalculation. Their core assumption is simple: increasing pressure, raising costs, and instilling an ultimatum will compel the opposing side to retreat. This model may have proven effective in many business cases or even certain political disputes, but when applied to Iran, it not only fails to work but often produces the opposite result.

The issue is not merely a tactical disagreement; it is with a profound misalignment at the level of "worldview." Throughout his career, whether in business or politics, Trump has relied on a specific pattern: maximum pressure to break the will of the opposing side. Within this framework, "time" is a weapon; the greater the pressure and the shorter the deadlines, the higher the likelihood of the opposing side's capitulation. This is the very logic behind many of his decisions regarding Iran: heavy sanctions, public threats, and media spectacles designed to create a sense of urgency.

But Iran fundamentally plays this game by different rules. In Iran's strategic mindset, "time" is not a constraint but an asset. The concept of "strategic patience," repeatedly echoed in Iran's official and unofficial discourse, reflects a historical perspective. A country with a history spanning several millennia, which has navigated through numerous external crises and pressures, is not easily swayed by short-term ultimatums. Within this framework, the more impatient the opposing side becomes, the more it is perceived as a sign of success, not weakness.

In other words, what Washington calls "increasing pressure" is interpreted in Tehran as "a sign of the opposing side's desperation." When this is combined with the element of culture, the dimensions become even more complex. In Iranian culture, negotiation is an interaction based on mutual respect. The literature, tone, and manner of the opposing side's approach play a decisive role in shaping the atmosphere for dialogue. Threat and humiliation not only fail to create an incentive for making concessions but also directly lead to greater resistance.

In such a context, when the President of the United States publicly speaks of bringing Iran to its knees, or uses language that more closely resembles the atmosphere of business rivalries than diplomacy, the outcome is predictable: the closure of space for negotiation.

The issue is not merely that Iran does not negotiate under pressure; more importantly, it fundamentally views "negotiation under pressure" as meaningless. From Tehran's perspective, negotiation becomes meaningful when the parties enter dialogue from a position of relative equality and while maintaining a minimum level of mutual respect. This point is one of the key perceptual differences between the two sides.

In Washington, success is often measured by demonstrable achievements: a formal agreement, a historic signing, or a joint statement. But in Tehran, the definition of success can be entirely different. Standing firm against pressure, preserving red lines, and preventing the imposition of the opposing side's demands is itself considered a "victory"—even if no agreement is reached. This is because, in Iranian culture, any agreement must be accompanied by the preservation of three principles: dignity, wisdom, and expediency. Otherwise, signing an agreement under pressure would yield no achievement for the Iranian people. This difference in defining success means that even if the two sides enter negotiations, they lack a shared understanding of the ultimate objective.

From this perspective, Trump's maximum pressure policy was faced with an internal contradiction from the outset. He sought to bring Iran to the negotiating table by raising costs, while simultaneously creating conditions that, from Iran's viewpoint, rendered any negotiation tantamount to capitulation. The result of such an approach was not progress in negotiations, but a deadlock of the diplomatic path.

Another important point is the differing interpretation of the concept of "urgency." In Trump's mental model, creating a sense of urgency in the opposing side is a key tool. This is the same logic employed in business deals: if the opposing side feels time is running out, it will concede more quickly.

But in the case of Iran, this assumption operates in exactly the opposite manner. Iran not only does not fear the prolongation of processes but, in many cases, views it as advantageous. The passage of time can alter regional and international equations, weaken coalitions, and erode pressures. Under such conditions, haste in reaching an agreement is seen as more detrimental to Iran than beneficial.

The more the American side emphasizes deadlines and threats, the greater the distance from Tehran becomes. This gap stems not solely from a divergence of interests but is rooted in a divergence in the "perception of the game." America imagines it is applying pressure to secure a better deal, whereas Iran views this behavior as a sign of weakness and instability on the opposing side. Consequently, not only is there no incentive to make concessions, but resistance is reinforced.

In such an atmosphere, a fundamental question arises: Can the same tools that have proven effective in other cases also yield results with Iran? The answer, based on past experience, is not particularly promising.

Danny Citrinowicz, a researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies in Israel and a former intelligence officer, has emphasized in a note that if a path is to be formed for de-escalation and reaching an understanding, this path inevitably requires a fundamental shift in approach. The first step is accepting the reality that Iran is not a conventional actor in the classical sense, and just as it receives unconventional pressure, it delivers unexpected responses. The second step is abandoning the notion of a quick win. In the Iran file, there is no instant or theatrical solution. Any progress requires time, patience, and sustained engagement—precisely the elements that have been weak or absent in Trump's approach.

The reality is that the policy of pressure and threat toward Iran is not only ineffective but often leads to the deepening of divides. This is an empirical observation that has been repeatedly confirmed in recent years. Trump has failed to grasp this reality, or perhaps he does not wish to grasp it. He has entered one of the most complex foreign policy dossiers with the same mindset that brought him success in business deals. But Iran is neither a commercial enterprise nor a negotiating party that will quickly return to the table and offer concessions under rising pressure. Here, the rules of the game are different, and as long as this difference remains unrecognized, any attempt to draw Iran to the negotiating table through pressure and threat will move further away from the goal rather than closer to it.

MNA

News ID 243849

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