Frazier has presented her six-month report on the implementation of the resolution, which covers the period from 15 December 2023 to 19 June 2024 to the United Nations Security Council on June 19, 2024.
She has encouraged the international community to act in line with paragraph 2 of resolution 2231 (2015), which calls upon all Member States, regional organizations, and international organizations to take such actions as may be appropriate to fully support the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
The full text of her report follows:
I. Introduction
1. The note by the President of the Security Council of 16 January 2016 (S/2016/44) sets forth the practical arrangements and procedures for the Council in carrying out tasks related to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), particularly with respect to the provisions specified in paragraphs 2 to 7 of annex B to that resolution.
2. According to the note, the Security Council should select, on an annual basis, one member to serve as its Facilitator for the functions specified therein. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of the note, and after consultations among the members of the Council, I was appointed as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) for the period ending 31 December 2024 (see S/2024/2).
3. It was also established in the note that the Facilitator should brief the other members of the Security Council on its work and the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) every six months, in parallel with the report submitted by the Secretary General on the implementation of the resolution.
4. The present report covers the period from 15 December 2023 to 19 June 2024.
II. Summary of the activities of the Security Council in the “2231 format”
5. On 15 December 2023, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations sent a letter addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2023/992), in which he outlined the views of the Islamic Republic of Iran with regard to the sixteenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2023/975), as described further in paragraph 9 of the present report.
6. On 18 December 2023, the Security Council was briefed (see S/PV.9511 and SC/15536) by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs on the sixteenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2023/975), by me as Facilitator on the work of the Council and the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2023/989), and by the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, on behalf of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in his capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission established in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, on the procurement channel (S/2023/963).
7. On 18 June 2024, the representatives of the Security Council for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) met in the “2231 format” and discussed the findings and recommendations of the seventeenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the resolution (S/2024/471).
8. During the reporting period, a total of 22 notes were circulated within the “2231 format”. In addition, a total of 16 official communications were sent to Member States and/or the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission, and a total of 15 communications from Member States and/or the Coordinator were received.
III. Monitoring the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
9. In the above-mentioned letter dated 15 December 2023 (S/2023/992), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran outlined the views and observations of his country regarding the sixteenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The letter contained 11 points, in which the Permanent Representative noted, inter alia, that his country underlined the need for the “full and unconditional implementation” of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and stated that the report of the Secretary-General continued to “disregard the root causes of the current challenges to the implementation” of the Plan of Action, including the “ongoing effects of unlawful sanctions” as imposed by the United States of America. Noting that the Secretary-General’s report both “ignored the statements and measures taken” by certain countries (France, Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), which had further “not taken appropriate measures to negate the relevant restrictive measures”, he noted that his country was left with “no option but to exercise its rights under paragraphs 26 and 36 of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action”. He stated that his country “continued its cooperation” with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and that its “peaceful nuclear energy programme” was “continuously scrutinized by the most robust monitoring and verification” of the Agency. The letter also recalled that the Islamic Republic of Iran “categorically rejects the unfounded allegations and assessments reflected in the report” and stressed that its previous statements as outlined in the annexes to documents S/2015/550 and S/2023/786 and the positions articulated therein remained “valid and relevant today just as they did previously”.
10. During the reporting period, the Joint Commission did not convene. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action coordinator continued to consult with the Plan participants and the United States on addressing developments regarding the Plan of Action, towards the possible return by the United States to the Plan of Action and to ensure the full and effective implementation of the Plan of Action by all.
11. In a letter dated 3 June 2024 (S/2024/429), the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom brought forth to the Security Council’s attention actions undertaken by the Islamic Republic of Iran “in violation” of resolution 2231 (2015). They noted the country’s “extensive violations of its Join Comprehensive Plan of Action commitments”, including “with respect to enrichment levels, including its stockpile of high enriched uranium”, as well as the “removal of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action monitoring arrangements; its decision to cease implementation of its Additional Protocol, modified code 3.1 …; and past uranium metal activities – a key step in the development of a nuclear weapon”. Furthermore, they stressed that “Iran’s decision … to remove all Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action monitoring equipment and de-designate experienced IAEA inspectors seriously affects the verification and monitoring capabilities and activities of IAEA”, and that this “knowledge gap has detrimental implications for the Agency’s ability to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme”. They stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran has made “irreversible gains […] in ways the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was designed to prevent” and that such “nuclear escalation has hollowed out the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, significantly reducing its non-proliferation value”. The representatives nevertheless reiterated that “the E3 have consistently upheld [their] commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” and their “commitment to a diplomatic solution”, having outlined their respective Governments’ actions on Transition Day in full accordance with the Plan of Action and resolution 2231 (2015).
12. In response to S/2024/429, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in a letter dated 5 June 2024 (S/2024/439), stated that his country “rejects all the allegations raised in the letter” and reiterated its position concerning “its peaceful nuclear program and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” in eight points. He further stated that his country’s decision to take “remedial measures … in full accordance with its inherent right under paragraphs 26 and 36 of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” was in reaction to the United States’ “unlawful unilateral withdrawal” from the Plan and the “subsequent failure” of France, Germany and the United Kingdom (“the E3”) to “uphold their commitments” and “to honour [their] obligations under paragraph 20 of annex V to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action”, representing a “significant non-compliance” that was “still ongoing”. Emphasizing the “absolutely peaceful nature” of his country’s nuclear programme and its unchanged principled policy, including persistent compliance “with its obligations under the comprehensive safeguard agreements”, he noted that the Islamic Republic of Iran reaffirmed “its unwavering commitment to diplomacy” and its willingness to resume talks with the aim of the “full implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action by all participants”.
13. In response to S/2024/429, the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, in a letter dated 12 June 2024 (S/2024/467), stated that his country considers the letter “another attempt … to mislead the Security Council”, to “divert attention from their own numerous violations of resolution 2231 (2015)” and to “shift responsibility to Iran for the crisis around the nuclear deal and the stagnation of the negotiations on its restoration”. Condemning such “counterproductive actions” and reiterating his country’s position as conveyed during the 4 June IAEA Board of Governors’ meeting (see S/2024/466), he emphasized that the Agency’s reports have presented that the Islamic Republic of Iran “remains the most thoroughly and closely verified State among the Agency’s members”, that the “total number of verification activities … is growing, despite the ‘freeze’ on inspections under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” and that the joint statement of 4 March 2023 between the Agency and the country has contributed to “further progress”. He also stated that his country was convinced that the international community was “still interested in constructive progress towards full implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” and as such negotiations have shown that it was “achievable”, it would still, nonetheless, require “mature political will”.
14. On 13 June 2024, the Permanent Representatives of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation circulated to the Security Council their joint statement delivered on 4 June 2024, under agenda item 6, of the session of the IAEA Board of Governors.
15. In line with paragraph 4 of resolution 2231 (2015), in which the Security Council requested the Director General of IAEA to provide regular updates to the Council on the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and to report at any time on any issue of concern directly affecting the fulfilment of those commitments, the Director General submitted to the Agency’s Board of Governors and to the Council ad hoc reports on 26 December 2023 (GOV/INF/2023/18) and 13 June 2024 (GOV/INF/2024/8) and regular reports on 26 February 2024 (GOV/2024/7) (S/2024/376) and 27 May 2024 (GOV/2024/26) on the Agency’s verification and monitoring activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran in the light of resolution 2231 (2015).
16. The 26 December 2023 ad hoc report (GOV/INF/2023/18) stated that the Agency had conducted an “interim inventory verification” at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) on 25 November 2023 and a “routine inspection” at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz on 27 November 2023. The 13 June 2024 ad-hoc report (GOV/INF/2024/8) stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran had informed the Agency it had commenced previously declared enrichment activities for low-enriched uranium at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz, the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz, and Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) facilities.
17. Regarding FFEP, the Agency verified that the Islamic Republic of Iran had “reverted to the modified interconnection of the two IR-6 cascades, […] that had been used from January to June 2023” in which the country had informed the Agency that the change had been made on 22 November 2023. The Agency was also informed that the country had “increased the rate at which UF6 [uranium hexafluoride] enriched up to 5 per cent of U-235 was being fed into the production process to approximately the same level (as that of January to June 2023)” (GOV/INF/2023/18, para. 6).
18. Regarding PFEP at Natanz, the Agency observed that the Islamic Republic of Iran had “increased the rate at which it was feeding UF6 enriched up to 5 per cent U-235 into the production process” (GOV/INF/2023/18, para. 7). On 19 and 24 December 2023, the Agency verified the quantities of UF6 enriched up to 60 per cent U-235 produced at both plants (PFEP and FFEP, respectively) and confirmed that since the end of November 2023, the rate at which the Islamic Republic of Iran had been producing uranium enriched up to 60 per cent U-235 at both facilities combined had “increased to approximately 9 kg per month”.
19. Both the February and May regular reports noted that between 16 January 2016 and 8 May 2019, the Agency verified and monitored the Islamic Republic of Iran’s implementation of its nuclear-related commitments in accordance with the Plan of Action. However, the reports also noted that the Agency’s verification and monitoring has been seriously affected by the cessation of Iran’s implementation of its nuclear related commitments under the Plan of Action. The situation has been exacerbated by the subsequent decision to remove all of the Agency’s Plan of Action-related surveillance and monitoring equipment and by Iran’s decision to stop provisionally applying the Additional Protocol. As such, the Agency has “lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the production and inventory of centrifuges, rotors and bellows, heavy water and UOC [uranium ore concentrate]”. The reports also noted that the Director General “deeply regrets” that Iran has yet to reverse its September 2023 decision to withdraw designations for several experienced Agency inspectors, adding that this is essential to fully allow the Agency to conduct its verification activities in Iran effectively. The May 2024 report noted that the country “has yet to reverse its decision” and “would expect Iran to do so in the context of the ongoing consultations between the Agency and Iran”.
20. Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s total stockpile of enriched uranium, the Agency noted that since 16 February 2021, it has not been able to verify “the stockpile precisely on any given day”, having “to rely instead on a small proportion of the total being based on Iran’s estimates”. Based on information provided by the country, the Agency has estimated that as of 11 May 2024, The Islamic Republic of Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 6201.3 kg – an increase of 675.8 kg since the February 2024 report – and is comprised of 5841.3 kg of uranium in the form of UF6; 203.5 kg of uranium in the form of uranium oxide and other intermediate products; 47.2 kg of uranium in fuel assemblies, plates and rods; 4.4 kg of uranium in targets; and 104.9 kg of uranium in liquid and solid scrap. The Islamic Republic of Iran’s stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium in the form of UF6 was 142.1 kg, an increase of 19.3 kg since the February 2024 report.
21. Pursuant to annex B of resolution 2231 (2015), the following restrictions applied for five and eight years, respectively, from the date of adoption of the Plan of Action (18 October 2015): arms-related transfers (paras. 5 and 6 (b)) and the travel ban (para. 6 (e)), until 18 October 2020; and the ballistic missile-related provisions (paras. 3 and 4) and assets freeze (para. 6 (c) and (d)), until 18 October 2023 (see also S/2023/989, para. 41).
IV. Procurement channel approval, notifications, and exemptions
22. During the reporting period, no new proposals for the supply of items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology set out in document INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 were submitted to the Security Council.
23. Since Implementation Day, a total of 52 proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) have been submitted to the Security Council by five Member States from three different regional groups, including States that are not participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. To date, of the 52 proposals that have been processed, 37 have been approved, 5 were not approved and 10 were withdrawn. On average, the proposals were processed through the procurement channel in 50 calendar days. After the withdrawal of the United States from the Plan of Action, the procurement channel continues to function, and the Joint Commission continues to stand ready to review proposals.
24. According to paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), certain nuclearrelated activities do not require approval but do require a notification to the Security Council or to both the Council and the Joint Commission. In this regard, during the reporting period, 14 notifications were submitted to the Council in relation to the transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran of equipment and technology covered by annex B, section 1 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1, intended for light water reactors.
25. No notifications were submitted to the Security Council related to the necessary modification of the two cascades at the Fordow facility for stable isotope production, and no notifications were submitted to the Council related to the modernization of the Arak reactor based on the agreed conceptual design.
26. On 31 May 2024, the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group transmitted to me the Group’s seventeenth six-month report of the Joint Commission (S/2024/435) in accordance with paragraph 6.10 of annex IV to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
V. Transparency, outreach, and guidance
27. As the Security Council’s Facilitator, I am increasingly aware of the challenging environment the “2231 format” is facing. However, I remain deeply committed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as endorsed by the Council in its resolution 2231 (2015).
28. As the Facilitator, I continue to focus on facilitating, strengthening, and promoting the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), including advocating for the full utilization of the procurement channel. I urge all Member States to continue to engage in dialogue and to acknowledge the importance of the Plan of Action as a multilateral agreement in nuclear non-proliferation.
29. Outreach activities by the Secretariat, as mandated by the note mentioned in paragraph 1 of the present report (S/2016/44), continue to foster awareness of resolution 2231 (2015). The website on the resolution, also managed and regularly updated by the Secretariat through the Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, continues to provide relevant and updated information.
30. In drafting the present report, numerous bilateral consultations with Member States and their representatives were held, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to discuss issues relevant to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). In my role as Facilitator, I continue to advocate for the Security Council’s collective responses to international peace and security issues.
31. I also encourage the international community to act in line with paragraph 2 of resolution 2231 (2015), which calls upon all Member States, regional organizations, and international organizations to take such actions as may be appropriate to fully support the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
MNA/IRN